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Abstract
One of the biggest challenges in on-line signature verifi-
cation is the detection of skilled forgeries. In this paper, we
propose a novel scheme, based on the Kinematic Theory of
rapid human movements and its associated Sigma LogNor-
mal model, to improve the performance of on-line signa-
ture verification systems. The approach combines the high
performance of DTW-based systems in verification tasks,
with the high potential for skilled forgery detection of the
Kinematic Theory of rapid human movements. Experiments
were carried out on the publicly available BiosecurID mul-
timodal database, comprising 400 subjects. Results show
that the performance of the DTW-based system improves for
both skilled and random forgeries.
1. Introduction
In the so-called Information Age in which identity au-
thentication is of the utmost importance, biometrics have
emerged as a reliable, fast and automatic identification tech-
nology. Among the different biometric traits (i.e., finger-
print, face, voice, iris, etc.), one of the most widely accepted
is the signature: we are used to signing credit card invoices
and contracts in an every day basis.
Even though the verification performance rates of sig-
nature based systems have reached significantly high stan-
dards, specially for random forgeries, skilled forgeries re-
main a big challenge for those systems. In the last decade,
some research has been carried out on forgeries detection
in off-line signatures. In order to address this problem, in
[6, 7] an analysis of geometrical properties at sub-stroke
level, such as the slope or the length of the sub-stroke, is
proposed. Even though results are encouraging, experi-
ments were carried out on small databases comprising 10
subjects. More recently, Madasu and Lovell proposed a
forgery detection system based on fuzzy angle features [12].
A 100% accuracy is reported on a 40 subjects database.
In the field of on-line signature, the amount of research
regarding skilled forgeries detection has been much more
scarce. Hasaine and Al-Maadeed proposed a skilled forg-
eries and simulated signatures detector based on differences
of on-line signals and their histograms [8]. They report
Equal Error Rates (EERs) below 0.1% for the QU on-line
signature DB (12 subjects) and for the ICDAR2009 signa-
ture verification competition dataset [3] (50 subjects).
In order to encourage further research efforts in the de-
tection of skilled forgeries, several international signature
verification competitions have recently included tasks on
this topic, from 4NSigComp2010 [11] to SigWiComp2013
[13]. The comparison of the automatic results to forensic
handwriting examiners opinions showed that those results
were not far away from human expert decisions. However,
the test sets considered comprised between 1 and 54 Eu-
ropean writers and results worsened when the number of
writers increased, thus raising the need for research on big-
ger and more statistically significant databases.
One common pitfall among those studies is that they fo-
cus on skilled forgeries detection but they do not apply that
knowledge to improve the performance of signature verifi-
cation systems, which is the main contribution of this work.
Therefore, the objectives of this article are twofold, namely:
propose 𝑖) a new method to detect on-line skilled forgeries
based on the Sigma LogNormal model, and 𝑖𝑖) a new gen-
eral on-line verification scheme, which integrates the infor-
mation given by a skilled forgery detector with the match-
ing scores of a regular on-line verification system. The en-
hanced novel approach significantly improves the perfor-
mance of top-ranked state-of-the-art matchers.
Even though most of the existing literature on skilled
forgeries detection considers off-line signatures, according
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Figure 1. Diagram of the proposed enhanced on-line signature verification system and division of the database into training, development
and test sets. For the training of the Linear Classifier, the train set in the database is used, while for the selection of the 𝛿 threshold and
weights (𝑊𝑓𝑔 and 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛) the development set is utilized.
to document examiners, the key differences between gen-
uine signatures and skilled forgeries include the speed, the
pressure, the hesitation or the tremor [7, 12]. Therefore,
the information provided by on-line signatures could be ex-
pected to be more reliable and accurate, as it is shown in the
better results achieved on the on-line corpus in [10].
Regarding the different features that can be extracted
from these on-line data, we have selected the approach
based on the Kinematic Theory of rapid human movements,
with its associated Sigma LogNormal representation of sig-
natures [16]. The main advantage of this model is that it
takes into account physical body features such as the neu-
romuscular system responsible for the production of a sig-
nature, and thus reflects some of the characteristics pointed
out above, as the hesitation or the tremor.
Finally, it should be noted that most of the related
works mentioned above report results on small and not
always publicly available databases. In order to make
our analysis reproducible and fairly comparable to future
research, experiments are carried out on the multimodal
BiosecurID database1, whose on-line signature corpus com-
prises 11,200 signatures form 400 subjects (6,400 genuine
signatures and 4,800 skilled forgeries).
The rest of the article is structured as follows: in Sect. 2,
the proposed system is presented. The experimental proto-
col is described in Sect. 3 and results included in Sect. 4.
Final conclusions are drawn in Sect. 5.
2. Proposed System
In order to improve the performance of on-line signa-
ture verification systems, we propose a scheme in which a
1See http://atvs.ii.uam.es/databases.jsp
new module, focused on the detection of skilled forgeries,
is added to the original verification system (see Fig. 1). De-
pending on the output of this new module (i.e., genuine sig-
nature or skilled forgery), the score emitted by the initial
verification system will be accordingly weighted, and the
final decision will be based on this weighted score.
First of all, it should be noted that, whereas there are only
two different sets of signatures (i.e., genuine signatures and
skilled forgeries), signature verification systems deal with
three sets of scores. In order to avoid confusion, the follow-
ing terms will be used throughout the article:
∙ Signatures: given a user 𝑈1,
– genuine signatures are the genuine samples pro-
duced by the signer 𝑈1,
– skilled forgeries are forgeries of genuine signa-
tures of 𝑈1 produced by a different signer 𝑈𝑖,
with 𝑖 ∕= 1.
∙ Scores: given a user 𝑈1, and its corresponding user
model 𝑀1, three sets of scores are computed:
– genuine scores, obtained comparing genuine sig-
natures from 𝑈1 to 𝑀1,
– random impostor scores, yielded by the compar-
isons between genuine signatures belonging to
users 𝑈𝑖, with 𝑖 ∕= 1, and 𝑀1,
– skilled impostor scores, computed matching
skilled forgeries of signatures of 𝑈1 to 𝑀1.
There are thus two sets of scores produced by genuine sig-
natures: genuine scores and random impostor scores. A
genuine acceptance threshold 𝛿, computed over the original
𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 scores, is introduced to separate them.
Therefore, as it may be observed in Fig. 1, the following
steps are performed to verify one signature:
∙ The skilled forgeries detector classifies the signature as
either genuine (denoted as Gen) or skilled forgery (de-
noted as Sk). This detector, based on Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis, LDA, takes four Sigma LogNormal pa-
rameters as input (𝑁 , 𝑆𝑁𝑅, 𝜇 and 𝜎, see Sect. 2.1),
and fits a multivariate Gaussian to each class. The final
decision is a binary value: 𝐶 = {Gen, Sk}.
∙ The baseline verification system, based on the very
popular Dynamic Time Warping algorithm [15], out-
puts a dissimilarity score (i.e., lower scores correspond
to more similar signatures, while higher scores corre-
spond to different signatures) between the input signa-
ture and the enrolled user model, 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 .
∙ This score, 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 , emitted by the baseline verification
system, will be weighted according to the decision of
the skilled detector classifier, 𝐶, that is:
𝑆 =
⎧⎨
⎩
𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 (1 +𝑊𝑓𝑔) if 𝐶=Sk
𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 (1 +𝑊𝑓𝑔) if 𝐶=Gen and 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 > 𝛿
𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 (1−𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛) if 𝐶=Gen and 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 < 𝛿
where 𝑊𝑓𝑔 ≥ 0 is the weight applied to scores that
correspond to potential forgeries (skilled or random)
while 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛 ≥ 0 is applied to scores potentially pro-
duced by two signatures coming from the same user.
The rationale behind the proposed approach is to “sup-
port” or “strengthen” the score given by the DTW system
(𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 ) according to the decision of the skilled detection
module (𝐶) and the genuine acceptation threshold (𝛿). Ac-
cording to these inputs, if the detector believes that the
score 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 corresponds to an impostor (either random, if
𝐶=Gen and 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 > 𝛿, or skilled, if 𝐶=Sk) the dissimilar-
ity score will be enlarged (𝑆 = 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 (1+𝑊𝑓𝑔)), that is, it
will be biased toward a “more probable impostor” decision.
The other way around, if the detector believes that it is a
genuine score (if 𝐶=Gen and 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 < 𝛿) it will be made
smaller (𝑆 = 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 (1 −𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛)), that is, biased toward a
“more genuine” decision.
The final decision will thus be based on the weighted 𝑆
dissimilarity score. If the baseline system outputs a simi-
larity score (and not a distance metric or dissimilarity score
as is this case), the signs corresponding to the weights 𝑊𝑓𝑔
and 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛, and the comparison with 𝛿, should be inverted.
2.1. The Sigma LogNormal Model
In the framework of the Kinematic theory for rapid hu-
man movements, the Sigma LogNormal model was devel-
oped as a new high level representation of on-line signa-
tures [16], in which single strokes are considered as primi-
tives from which complex patterns are built. Each primitive
has a LogNormal velocity profile (∣𝑣𝑖(𝑡;𝑃𝑖)∣) and a complex
pattern is produced by summing up strokes, whose angular
positions are determined by 𝜙𝑖(𝑡;𝑃𝑖):
𝜙𝑖(𝑡;𝑃𝑖) = 𝜃𝑑𝑖 +
𝜃𝑓𝑖 − 𝜃𝑑𝑖
𝐷𝑖
∫ 𝑡
0
∣𝑣𝑖(𝜏 ;𝑃𝑖)∣d𝜏
∣𝑣𝑖(𝑡;𝑃𝑖)∣ = 𝐷𝑖
𝜎 (𝑡− 𝑡0𝑖)
√
2𝜋
exp
(
[ln (𝑡− 𝑡0𝑖)− 𝜇𝑖]2
−2𝜎2𝑖
)
𝑃𝑖 = (𝑡0𝑖, 𝐷𝑖, 𝜃𝑑𝑖, 𝜃𝑓𝑖, 𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑖)
Here 𝑃𝑖 represents the parameters of the 𝑖-th stroke, where
𝑡0𝑖 is the starting time, 𝐷𝑖 its length, 𝜃𝑖𝑑 and 𝜃𝑓𝑖 the start-
ing and ending direction angles, 𝜇𝑖 the logtime delay and 𝜎𝑖
the logresponse time. These last two parameters character-
ize the LogNormal impulse response of the neuromuscular
system. This model establishes the theoretical ideal rep-
resentation of the signature, being the differences between
this ideal model and the behaviour of the actual instance of
a signature measured in terms of the Signal to Noise Ratio
(SNR), defined over the velocity signals.
This theory is based on the human writing behaviour and
it can be of great use in the very difficult task of skilled
forgery detection. It has been shown that signing is a well-
learnt movement very accurately represented by the Sigma
LogNormal model. We may therefore assume that when an
imitator produces a skilled forgery, he is not as trained as the
genuine signer and the produced signatures will hence drift
away from LogNormality. In particular, the Sigma Log-
Normal model is capable of detecting typical signing be-
haviours found in skilled forgeries and pointed out by calli-
graphic experts, such as: hesitation (which translates into a
higher number of strokes or Sigma LogNormal curves in the
velocity function 𝑁 ) and unnatural velocity profiles with
very slow strokes.
In order to analyse the variations of the neuromuscular
responses in the whole signature, not in each single stroke,
we will focus on four parameters: 𝑁 , 𝑆𝑁𝑅, and the aver-
ages across all the strokes of 𝜇 and 𝜎.
2.2. On-Line Signature Verification with DTW
For the baseline signature verification system we chose
the function-based local approach described in [15], which
ranked among the top three algorithms at BSEC-2009 [9].
In this approach, 9 different time functions (selected us-
ing SFFS from a total of 34 features in [15]) are directly
matched using an elastic technique, based on Dynamic Pro-
gramming, known as Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [15].
This algorithm offers a solution to the challenging problem
of matching time sequences of variable lengths minimiz-
ing a pre-defined distance measure. In this particular im-
plementation, the Euclidean distance is used and only three
correspondences among samples are allowed.
Table 1. Performance of the skilled forgeries detector over the de-
velopment and the test sets.
GER SER HTER
Devel Set 13.56% 28.58% 21.07%
Test Set 14.53% 37.78% 26.15%
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Figure 2. FRR and JFAR for the development set. The crossing
point is marked by a vertical dashed line.
The final score output by the system (𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 ) is com-
puted as the average of the partial scores between the test
sample and all the enrolled signatures of the user model.
3. Experimental Protocol
Experiments are carried out over the on-line signature
corpus of the multimodal BiosecurID database [5]. It
comprises 400 subjects with 16 original signatures and 12
skilled forgeries per user, created by the three following
subjects. The database was captured in an office-like en-
vironment in four acquisition sessions, each separated two
months. Users were asked to sign on a piece of paper placed
on a Wacom Intuos 3 pen tablet, that captured the time sig-
nals of each signature at a 100 Hz sampling rate.
The database is divided into three independent sets, so
that evaluation results are not biased (see Fig. 1 right): train-
ing set (first 50 subjects), development set (second 100 sub-
jects) and test set (last 250 subjects). User models are en-
rolled with the 4 signatures belonging to session 1.
In order to evaluate the performance over the develop-
ment or the test set, for each subject 𝑖) genuine scores are
computed comparing signatures of sessions 2, 3 and 4 (not
used for enrolment) to the enrolled model of that same user,
𝑖𝑖) skilled impostor scores are obtained comparing all the
skilled forgeries to their corresponding enrolled model, and
𝑖𝑖𝑖) random impostor scores are yielded matching the en-
rolled models to the first signature of the fourth session of
the remaining users.
Finally, three steps have been followed to evaluate the
performance of the proposed system, one on each of the
sets in which the database is divided into:
∙ Step 1. Skilled forgery detector training (training set).
Train the skilled forgeries detection module over the
training set of the database.
∙ Step 2. Parameters optimization (development set).
Define the genuine acceptation threshold 𝛿 over the
raw 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 scores, in order to distinguish random im-
postor scores from genuine scores. Select best weights
configuration (𝑊𝑓𝑔, 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛) over the development set,
in terms of the Equal Error Rate (EER) of the proposed
system.
∙ Step 3: Performance evaluation (test set). Evaluate the
configuration selected in the previous steps over the
test set, in terms of the EER and the Detection Error
Trade-off (DET) curves.
4. Results
The experiments follow the steps defined in Sect. 3 with
a threefold objective:: 𝑖) first estimate the potential of the
Sigma LogNormal model to detect skilled forgeries, 𝑖𝑖)
then find the best performing configuration of parameters
(𝛿, 𝑊𝑓𝑔 , 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛), and 𝑖𝑖𝑖) finally evaluate the proposed sys-
tem performance over the test set. All sets of experiments
are run over independent subsets of the database, so that the
results are not biased.
4.1. Step 1: Skilled Forgery Detector Training
The training of the skilled forgery detector is carried out
in two successive phases. First, the Sigma LogNormal pa-
rameters considered in the study [𝑁 , 𝑆𝑁𝑅, 𝜇, 𝜎] are ex-
tracted from all the signatures in the training set, that is:
50 × 16 = 800 genuine signatures and 50 × 12 = 600
skilled forgeries. Then, the feature vectors of genuine and
skilled forgeries are used to train a linear classifier in order
to distinguish between the two classes: genuine or skilled
forgery.
The performance of the classifier is finally assessed on
the development set over 1,600 genuine signatures and
1,200 skilled forgeries. The results are reported in Table 1
in terms of the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) defined as
HTER=(GER+SER)/2, where the GER is the Genuine Error
Rate (number of genuine signatures classified as forgeries)
and the SER is the Skilled Error Rate (number of skilled
forgeries classified as genuine). As it may be observed, the
HTER achieved is 21% for the development set.
4.2. Step 2: Parameters Optimization
After training the skilled forgeries detector, the full sys-
tem parameters (𝛿, 𝑊𝑓𝑔 and 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛) are optimized in two
steps over the development set (see Fig. 1 right). Accord-
ing to the experimental protocol defined in Sect. 3, a total
number of 100 × 12 = 1, 200 genuine, 100 × 12 = 1, 200
Table 2. EERs, in %, on the development set for different values of the weights (𝑊𝑓𝑔 , 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛). The relative difference w.r.t. the baseline
(EERsk = 3.58% and EERrd = 0.93%) is shown in parentheses (in %), and in green (if EER improves) or red letter (if it worsens). The
best configuration is highlighted in bold.
Skilled Forgeries Random Forgeries
𝑊𝑓𝑔
𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
1.3 3.00 (↓ 16) 2.83 (↓ 21) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.26 (↓ 72) 0.52 (↓ 45) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
1.5 2.83 (↓ 21) 2.67 (↓ 26) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.14 (↓ 85) 0.29 (↓ 68) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
1.6 2.75 (↓ 23) 2.58 (↓ 28) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.09 (↓ 90) 0.26 (↓ 72) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
1.7 2.75 (↓ 23) 2.50 (↓ 30) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.09 (↓ 90) 0.21 (↓ 77) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
1.8 2.75 (↓ 23) 2.50 (↓ 30) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.09 (↓ 90) 0.21 (↓ 77) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
3 2.75 (↓ 23) 2.50 (↓ 30) 2.58 (↓ 28) 3.25 (↓ 9) 4.58 (↑ 28) 0.09 (↓ 90) 0.21 (↓ 77) 0.68 (↓ 27) 1.10 (↑ 18) 1.77 (↑ 90)
Table 3. EERs on the test set, for DTW and DTW + SL.
Skilled Random
DTW 5.80 1.07
DTW + SL 4.77 (↓ 18) 0.50 (↓ 53)
skilled impostor and 100 × 99 = 9, 900 random impostor
scores are considered for these experiments.
In the first step, a threshold 𝛿 is selected to tell random
forgeries and genuine scores apart. The optimum value for
𝛿 is selected as the crossing point of the Joint-False Accep-
tance (JFAR) and False Rejection Rates (FRR), depicted in
Fig. 2, where JFAR denotes a FAR comprising both skilled
and random forgeries scores. As it may be observed, the
crossing point is marked with a vertical line at 4, thus set-
ting 𝛿 = 4 for the remaining experiments.
After fixing 𝛿, the performance of the global system is
evaluated in terms of the EER, for different values of 𝑊𝑓𝑔
and 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛, so that the optimum values are found. The
ranges were empirically selected for both weights: outside
those ranges, performance under one of the forgeries sce-
narios considerably drops. Results are shown in Table 2,
where the EER for each considered set of parameters is
included as well as the relative difference with respect to
the baseline. EERsk = 3.58% denotes the EER under the
skilled forgeries scenario for the baseline, and, equivalently,
EERrd = 0.93% denotes the EER for the random forgeries.
Two different trends may be observed in Table 2: 𝑖)
under both forgeries scenarios, the bigger 𝑊𝑓𝑔 , the bet-
ter the performance, reaching a bottom limit for 𝑊𝑓𝑔 =
1.7; 𝑖𝑖) whereas under the random forgeries scenario, the
smaller the value of 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛, the better (i.e., optimum found
at 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛 = 0), for skilled forgeries, the best performance is
reached for 𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛 = 0.1. Taking these two considerations
into account, a balance should be reached where the per-
formance is at its best under both scenarios. As it may be
seen in Table 2, a good balance is achieved for 𝑊𝑓𝑔 ≥ 1.7,
𝑊𝑔𝑒𝑛 = 0.1.
4.3. Step 3: Performance Evaluation
Finally, in order to evaluate the performance of the full
verification system, the test set is used (see Fig. 1 right). As
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Figure 3. DET curves for the DTW baseline system and the full
system (denoted DTW + SL) over the test set.
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Figure 4. Score distributions before (solid lines) and after (dashed
lines) applying the skilled detection module.
mentioned in Sect. 3, 250×12 = 3, 000 genuine, 250×12 =
3, 000 skilled impostor and 250 × 249 = 62, 250 random
impostor scores are computed. These sets of scores are used
to compute the Detection Error Trade-off (DET) curves in
the random and impostor scenarios depicted in Fig. 3 and
the corresponding EERs are summarized in Table 3. Also
the distributions corresponding to these three sets of scores
are depicted in Fig. 4, both for the case of the original DTW
system and for the improved DTW-SL scheme proposed.
As it may be observed in Fig. 3, verification performance
is improved at all operating points, this improvement being
36% on average at the EER. This performance improvement
may be also observed in the bigger distance between the
scores distributions in Fig. 4, where the 𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑊 scores are
depicted in solid lines, and their corresponding weighted
scores 𝑆 in dashed lines. It should be noted that, in the pre-
vious works using the same database and protocol, the per-
formance achieved was lower (i.e., higher EERs). In [1], an
HMM-based online signature verification system achieves
EERs over 9%. Similarly, in [2], if just online information
is considered, EERsk = 2.88% and EERrd = 5.83% are
reported.
5. Conclusions
In the present article, a new enhanced and efficient on-
line signature verification system has been proposed. A
skilled forgery detector, fitting a multivariate Gaussian to
each class (namely, genuine signatures and skilled forg-
eries) was trained with Sigma LogNormal features, and its
output used to adapt the initial score emitted by the original
verification system. It should be noted that this scheme re-
quires skilled forgeries to train the skilled detector. Even if
it is a requirement not needed by classical verification sys-
tems, this is not a too-strong assumption as there are public
databases providing such data.
Experiments were carried out on the on-line signature
corpus of the publicly available BiosecurID multimodal
database. The database was divided into three independent
sets so that results were not biased. Results showed im-
provements at all operating points, reaching around a 36%
improvement at the EER.
As future work lines we consider the improvement of
the skilled detector as this is the key for the increase of
the performance of the complete system. Also the fusion
of the knowledge provided by the skilled detector and the
verification score will be improved, following the exam-
ples of previous works on anti-spoofing and verification
systems fusion in [4, 14], where different sequential- and
classifier-based approaches, as well as decision- and score-
level fusion of anti-spoofing and verification systems, for
face and fingerprint, are explored. Other signature matchers
and databases will be taken into account as well.
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